Conflict of interest in policing and the public sector by Boyce, Gordon & Davids, Cindy
	 	
	
 
This is the published version 
 
Boyce, Gordon and Davids, Cindy 2009, Conflict of interest in policing and 
the public sector, Public management review, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 601-640. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30024927	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright: 2009, Taylor and Francis 
 
 
 
  
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by: [Deakin University]
On: 15 March 2010
Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 907464590]
Publisher Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-
41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Public Management Review
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713926128
Conflict of Interest in Policing and the Public Sector
Gordon Boyce a; Cindy Davids b
a Accounting and Finance, Economic and Financial Studies, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia b
Faculty of Arts, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
To cite this Article Boyce, Gordon and Davids, Cindy(2009) 'Conflict of Interest in Policing and the Public Sector', Public
Management Review, 11: 5, 601 — 640
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14719030902798255
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719030902798255
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
CONFLICT OF
INTEREST IN
POLICING AND THE
PUBLIC SECTOR
Ethics, integrity and social
accountability
Gordon Boyce and
Cindy Davids
Gordon Boyce
Accounting and Finance
Economic and Financial Studies
Macquarie University
Sydney, 2109
Australia
E-mail: gboyce@efs.mq.edu.au
Cindy Davids
Faculty of Arts
Macquarie University
Sydney, 2109
Australia
E-mail: Cindy.Davids@pict.mq.edu.au
Abstract
Conflicts of interest are a key factor in the
contemporary decline of trust in government
and public institutions, eroding public trust in
government and democratic systems. Draw-
ing on two unique empirical studies involving
policing and the broader public sector, this
paper explores the meaning and dimensions
of conflict of interest by examining public
complaints about conflict of interest and
providing distinctive insights into the nature
of conflict of interest as a problem for public
sector ethics. The paper analyses and
explores appropriate regulatory and manage-
ment approaches for conflict of interest,
focusing on three elements: (1) dealing with
private interests that are identifiably proble-
matic in the way they clash with the duties of
public officials; (2) managing conflicts as
they arise in the course of public sector work
(manifested in preferential and adverse treat-
ment, and other problematic areas); and (3)
developing ethical and accountable organisa-
tional cultures. It is concluded that effective
and meaningful public sector ethics in the
pursuit of the public interest must be based
on an ethos of social accountability and a
commitment to prioritise the public interest in
both fact and appearance.
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INTRODUCTION
Conflicts of interest give rise to one of the most common forms of unethical conduct in
public service and are recognized to have contributed to a general decline in perceived
standards of conduct in public office (Kernaghan and Langford 1990: 133; Committee
on Standards in Public Life 1995; Young 1998, 2006; Stark 2000; Cepeda Ulloa 2004;
Graham 2006; Ombudsman 2008b). The problem of conflict of interest ‘goes to the
essence of the expectation that public officials should perform their duties in a fair and
unbiased way’ (Ombudsman 2003: 77) and has the capacity to damage the performance
of almost all functions in the public sector. At issue are good public administration,
public accountability, confidence in public sector integrity, and the trust which citizens
hold in governments, official institutions, public officials,1 and democratic systems more
broadly.
Bodies such as the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD), the European Union, Asian Development Bank, and Transparency Inter-
national have all recognized that effective systems for dealing with conflicts of interest
are an essential element in public governance and accountability (Pope 2000b; OECD
2003a, 2005, 2006; Raile 2004; Asian Development Bank and OECD 2006a, 2006b).
For example:
Serving the public interest is the fundamental mission of governments and public institutions. Citizens
expect individual public officials to perform their duties with integrity, in a fair and unbiased way.
Governments are increasingly expected to ensure that public officials do not allow their private interests
and affiliations to compromise official decision-making and public management. In an increasingly
demanding society, inadequately managed conflicts of interest on the part of public officials have the
potential to weaken citizens’ trust in public institutions.
(OECD 2003b: 1)
The challenges in dealing with conflicts of interest have become more complex and
more important in the contemporary environment, which is characterized by greater
interconnection and collaboration between the public sector and business and not-for-
profit sectors. Broader trends in New Public Management, including outsourcing,
contracting-out, public/private partnerships, self-regulation, sponsorships, and a signi-
ficant interchange of personnel between the public and private sectors, have broken
down traditional public sector employment cultures and their attendant obligations
and loyalties, and the infusion of business principles, approaches, and people have
dramatically affected the culture of public service organizations (see Pollitt 1993;
Hood 1995a, 1995b; Davids and Hancock 1998; Olson et al. 1998; Peters and Savoie
1998; Jones et al. 2001). This has also created a new context in which understanding
of conflict of interest issues has become more important, but less evident at many
levels of government (see Davids 1998; Young 1998, 2002; Stark 2000). Despite
recognition of the challenges posed by conflicts of interest, poor understanding of the
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issues involved often results in inadequate systems of regulation and management
(Ombudsman 2008b).
This article draws on, integrates, and extends two empirical studies of conflict of
interest in the public sector in the Australian state of Victoria. Both studies explored the
issue of conflict of interest in depth by examining public complaints about conflict of
interest. The first study related to policing and the second to the public sector more
generally. The research was made possible through the agreement and assistance of
Victoria Police and Ombudsman Victoria in providing full research access to original
complaint case files. Together, the studies provide a picture of practical
(mis)understandings about conflict of interest on the part of public complainants,
public officers the subject of complaints, public managers responsible for dealing with
these matters, and the public agency responsible for the oversight of complaints (in the
case of policing) and the investigation and reporting on complaints (in the case of the
public sector more broadly) – Ombudsman Victoria.
The remainder of the article is organized into six substantive sections. First, the
concept of accountability is outlined as a framing notion underlying the article. In
the following section we provide an explication of the problem by clearly defining the
constituent components of conflict of interest in a manner that clarifies issues that are
often confused through the (often inconsistent) use of terms like ‘real’, ‘apparent’ and
‘potential’ conflict of interest. The next three sections explore three elements that
emerged from the research as areas that must be attended to in an effective system of
regulation and management. First is the element of interests and the desirability, from
the perspective of public sector ethics, of limiting public officials’ private interests in
identifiable problematic areas. Second, the manifestations of conflict of interest in the
public sector are explored, focusing on evident forms of duty failure that emerged
from the research. These include various types of preferential and adverse treatment
and several areas of public sector activity that are particularly vulnerable to conflicts of
interest. The following section considers the importance of an overarching awareness of
conflict of interest issues within ethical and socially accountable organizational cultures.
The final section draws together the conclusions from the analysis.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND PROBLEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
At the heart of many conflict of interest problems are issues of accountability –
recognized to be a core public sector ethical value (Corbett 1992; Nolan et al. 1995;
Sherman 1998). Although financial accountability often dominates public discourse,
a broader conception of accountability includes political, legal and constitutional
accountability, social and community accountability, and personal and ethical accoun-
tability (Corbett 1992: esp. ch. 5). Accountability as a practical exercise is characterized
by ‘messiness . . . flows, circuits, connections, disconnections, selections, favourings,
accounts, holding to account and attempts at analysis’ (Neyland and Woolgar 2002:
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272). Therefore, holding individuals and organizations to account is a complex and
difficult activity (Uhr 1993; Thomas 1998).
Building on the basic idea of ‘accountability’ as ‘a relationship in which people are
required to explain and take responsibility for their actions’ (Sinclair 1995: 220–1), a
more encompassing notion of ‘social accountability’ is used here to denote a broad-
scope accountability (cf. Parker 1996) that incorporates multiple dimensions and is
intimately concerned with answerability (Blatz 1972) and responsibility (Bovens 1998;
Parker and Gould 1999). The core concept of accountability for the public sector is that
any public official who possesses and exercises legal power and authority must be
accountable to the community for the exercise of that power, but social accountability
centres on a bottom–up social rather than a top–down organizational perspective on
accountability (Roberts 1991, 1996; Bovens 1998). Social accountability may address
ethical, organizational, and cultural dimensions of public sector management.
In the present context, the notion of social accountability focuses on the public ethics
dimensions of conflict of interest and the notion that responsibilities in the public sector
require both ex post answering for past decisions and actions and the need to have
mechanisms in place that seek to deal with neglects of duty before they happen. In both of
these aspects some level of attention to political optics in terms of ‘how things look’ to
reasonable members of the public (Stark 2000) is also required. Thus, social accoun-
tability is an expansive concept that includes a need to account for both facts and
appearances, recognizing that both impact on public confidence in public institutions, in
part because the ‘demands of accountability remind officials of the duties of public trust to
comply with community standards which underpin discretionary power and respon-
sibilities’ (Uhr 1993: 4). The power and authority vested in the public sector and the need
for organizations to retain public legitimacy make social aspects of accountability vital.
Uhr’s (1993) work implies that the initiative in accountability processes should be
with the recipient of accounts, as questioners, rather than with the account-giver. It is
the capacity to call for explanations for conduct that ‘defines the locus of authority in
any given society’ (Day and Klein 1987: 9; see also Buttny 1993). The preparedness to
submit to scrutiny implied by accountability (Nolan et al. 1995) means that
accountability is operationalized in the presence of some forum – which may comprise
a formal disciplinary committee or tribunal, a public forum, or a less formal forum of
colleagues, family, and friends, or even the ‘forum internum’ of the conscience (Bovens
1998: 23–4). This article focuses on one important sociopolitical mechanism through
which such public calls-to-account may be made – the office of an Ombudsman as a
forum for citizen complaints about public sector administrative actions. In many
western democracies, the Ombudsman plays a significant role as an avenue of complaint
and oversight of public sector organizations and agencies, thus forming a crucial aspect
of the social accountability of the public sector. Underlying the effectiveness of any such
mechanism is a shared acceptance that there is an external reference point (an ‘other’)
that must be taken into account when making decisions or taking actions, and when
judging those decisions or actions (see Dubnick 1998: 76).
604 Public Management Review
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DEFINING THE PROBLEM: INTERESTS, CONFLICTS, AND PERCEPTIONS
There is a distinction between conflict of interest and other forms of official wrong-
doing, even though the two are related. Many studies of this issue do not clearly or
unambiguously distinguish the underlying problem of conflict from its manifestations in
breaches or other neglects of official duty. Although the latter may flow from conflicts of
interest, they do not constitute the conflicts themselves (see Davids 2008; cf. Parker
1987). Thus, there is a conceptual and practical distinction between (1) problematic
or potentially problematic situations (conflicts of interest); (2) problematic actions
(breaches or neglects of duty that flow from conflicts of interest);2 and (3) problems
of perception or appearances of conflict of interest, judged using a ‘reasonable person’
standard (Davids 2008).
The particular value of a clearly defined concept of conflict of interest is in tying
these three elements together in a regulatory and management framework that draws
attention to the capacity of private interests to affect the performance of public duties.
Such a capacity is prior to an actual breach of duty; thus, this idea adds to notions of
public sector ethics, integrity, and social accountability by encompassing situations
anterior to neglects of duty. The significance accorded to public perceptions in analysis
of conflict of interest is a further dimension that distinguishes conflict of interest from
many other public sector ethical problems.
Management of public sector conflicts of interest is complex because, on the one
hand, many functions in the public sector are necessarily carried out within a broad
realm of judgement and discretion on the part of individual public officials, while, on
the other hand, it is within this discretionary realm that individuals may have the
greatest capacity to benefit private interests. The rest of this section considers: (a) the
range of interests that may be regarded as problematic; (b) the ways in which such
interests may conflict with official duties; and (c) the manner in which significance is
accorded to appearances and public perceptions when dealing with conflict of interest
problems. Building on the notion of conflict of interest as primarily an accountability
problem (discussed above), the three components of conflict of interest are then
distilled into a framework for public management of the problem. The elements of this
framework are then analysed in the remainder of the article, which draws on two
empirical studies to analyse three key elements of conflict of interest regulation and
management in the public sector.
Interests
Interests are encumbrances on a public officer in the performance of official duties
(Stark 2000: 9). A multiplicity of interests is a ‘part of the human condition’ for
any ‘socialized, passionate, interested human being functioning in a complex world’
(Werhane and Doering 1992: 51, 50), but some private interests are of concern
Boyce & Davids: Conflict of interest in policing and the public sector 605
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because they may tend to interfere with the proper performance of official duties.
Although some traditional explanations of conflict of interest restrict concern to private
financial interests (e.g. Black’s Law Dictionary, cited in Carson 1994; see also Owen
1997),3 contemporary conceptions relate to any ‘influence, loyalty, or other concern
capable of compromising . . .’ the performance of a duty specific to a role (Davis 1982:
18). Thus, non-financial interests are of equivalent concern in terms of their capacity to
compromise the performance of official duties. Subjective or ideological biases,
associational and partisan affiliations and attachments, predispositions and prejudge-
ments, and even moral beliefs and aesthetic judgements may all be relevant interests in
this context. The interests of family, friends, professional colleagues, or other associates
are also germane because they too may influence a public officer in the performance of
official duty. Further, enmity towards particular individuals or groups may also be
regarded as problematic because, just as a conflict of interest may be manifested in
preferential treatment for friends, it may also be associated with adverse treatment for
enemies.
The key distinction to be drawn is between private interests that are encumbering in
terms of a capacity to affect performance of official duties, and those that are not. As a
practical matter, regulatory concern relates to interests not held in common with other
members of society principally by virtue of being a citizen. For example, generalized
interests held in common with other members of society may relate to a general status
as home owner, investor, taxpayer, parent, or employee. These interests, expressed
in a general sense, cannot be regarded as sufficiently personal interests; however specific
investments, home localities, or schools, for example, may be regarded as relevant
interests.
Conflicts
The second key element of conflict of interest concerns the manner in which private
interests become problematic when they conflict with official duties. Conflict takes place
in the mind, impairing, undermining, or disrupting competent judgement such that it is
unable to function in a ‘disinterested’ manner. Because one cannot peer into the mind of
a person in order to determine whether a private interest actually affected the particular
judgement, decision, or action of a public official, regulation and management of conflict
of interest focuses not on subjective states of mind, but on situations that can be
objectively perceived as giving rise to conflicts (see Stark 2000; Davids 2008). Although
the real problem is the possibility that individuals are judgementally impaired by their
own interests, regulation focuses on interests that can objectively be determined to
encumber or impair judgement and a conflict is regarded to be present when there is a
capacity for a known private interest to affect the performance of official duties.
To prevent conflicts, the holding of certain kinds of interests may be prohibited
altogether, and/or taking any official decisions or actions that materially affect those
606 Public Management Review
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interests. This approach is prophylactic or preventive in orientation because particular
rules and regulations are designed to (indirectly) prevent something other than that
which is specifically prohibited. For example, rules that prohibit certain kinds of outside
employment are not necessarily predicated on an assumption that such employment is
bad in and of itself, but that it may interfere with the proper performance of official
duties, and that a reasonable observer could conclude that it is likely to so interfere.
Similarly, rules that prohibit public officials from receiving gifts under certain cir-
cumstances do not reflect a position that the giving and receiving of gifts is intrinsically
bad. Rather, they are designed to prevent the receipt of gifts from influencing – or
being seen to influence – the performance of public duty (see Davids and Boyce 2008).
A prophylactic approach is generally regarded as more effective than a hortatory
approach which would merely exhort officials to not become psychologically beholden
to gift givers. Under this approach, rules may be designed to prevent conflicts – and
appearances thereof – and thereby to obviate the possibility of consequent or associated
breaches of duty.
Appearances and perceptions
Public trust is closely tied to the issue of integrity, and effective public administration
and maintenance of public trust requires that the private interests of public officials
neither influence nor be seen to influence the performance of public functions.
Regulators and public oversight bodies may therefore take the view that the impact on
‘public confidence in the integrity of the public sector’ makes appearances of conflict of
interest as serious as actual conflicts (e.g. Integrity Commissioner 2002). On this view,
it may be considered legally and morally appropriate to penalize public officials for
‘mishandling political optics as well as political realities . . . for neglecting to consider
‘‘how things look’’’ (Stark 2000: 17). Acceptance of such standards is implicit in the
principles of public employment and the ideals of public service, which mean that at
the point of a decision or action, private or sectional gain must always be subsumed to
the wider public interest. If a public official acts in relation to a matter where they may
be reasonably perceived to have a private interest, their actions and decisions may be
tainted in the public mind. As noted by the Victorian Ombudsman (2003: 77):
The key issue in the notion of conflict of interest is the matter of perception. In other words, for a conflict
of interest to arise it is not necessary that a person should have done anything improper: it is sufficient
that third parties might reasonably question the ability of that person to act impartially or reasonably ask
whether that person could have gained a personal benefit.
Mere perceptions, which may themselves be based on ignorance or coloured by
ideological and other subjective biases, are not sufficient in this context, but the
‘reasonable’ perceptions of a ‘reasonable’ observer. The test to be applied is similar to
Boyce & Davids: Conflict of interest in policing and the public sector 607
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the common law notion of the ‘reasonable person’ and is thus an objective standard on
the basis of directly observable states rather than interpretations of perceived mental
states. Difficulties associated with judging the ‘rightness’ of subjective decisions and the
validity of subjective defences such as ‘I did not allow myself to be influenced . . .’ are
obviated in applying this test. Although unreasonable or irrational perceptions cannot
themselves be eliminated, if the known facts could lead a reasonable person to conclude
that a conflict of interest exists, then the conflict of interest so perceived is a problem.
Formalizing the definitions
Drawing the preceding considerations together, the following formal definitions of
conflict of interest were developed:
. A conflict of interest is any conflict between the personal or private interests of a
public officer and the officer’s duty to act in the public interest.
. The personal or private interests of a public officer include those of family members,
friends, associates, organizations to which the officer belongs, and other similar
interests.
. Interests include financial and non-financial interests.
. Financial interests include receipt or possession of money and goods in a range of
circumstances, including outside employment and private business activities.
. Non-financial interests include influences, loyalties, subjective or ideological
biases, personal beliefs and predispositions, membership of civic organizations
and associations, partisan affiliations and attachments, predispositions and pre-
judgements, moral beliefs and aesthetic judgements, and enmity towards
individuals or groups.
. A conflict exists in any situation where a public official could be influenced, or
could be reasonably perceived by an outside observer to be influenced, by a
private interest when performing an official function.
. Acting in the public interest encompasses obligations in regard to administration,
ethics, and performance, in accordance with recognized public sector principles
and values.4
(See Davids 2008: ch. 2; Ombudsman 2008b: 62.)
EMPIRICAL MATERIALS AND METHOD
Accountability cannot be understood merely by articulating sets of values, processes,
and practices, nor can it be reduced to technical or procedural exercises. It must be
contextualized by considering how it is actually played out in practice, and it must be
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recognized that its practice is ‘shot through with values and assumptions’ (Day and
Klein 1987: 52). Public complaints procedures have become a crucial part of
contemporary systems of public accountability, but examining complaints systems is
complex because they are also a key element in internal management and disciplinary
procedures.
Although formal public reports provide information on the outcomes of investi-
gations or inquiries, the workings of public complaints systems are often opaque and
sometimes unclear to participants in them and to members of the public generally.
Research into the mundane functioning of systems for dealing with public complaints
can therefore provide insights into the operation of internal and external accountability
functions. This article draws on two empirical investigations into public complaints
about conflict of interest (outlined below, in the order in which they were undertaken).
The second study built on the first, drawing on and expanding its insights while using a
broader data set to provide a richer picture of conflict of interest. Both studies included
evidence on the role of the Ombudsman5 as an investigating and oversight agency.
Study 1: Victoria Police
The first study examined ten years of conflict of interest complaints against police
officers in the Australian state of Victoria. The research was undertaken in an
environment where issues around conflict of interest in policing had become matters
for public concern. Corruption and misconduct in policing are relatively constant
phenomena that have been related in various ways to concerns about conflict of interest
(see Knapp 1972; Fitzgerald 1989; Finnane 1994; Mollen 1994; Wood 1997; HM
Inspectorate of Constabulary 1999; Newburn 1999; Miller 2003; Kennedy 2004). In
Victoria, particular concerns about conflict of interest arose following a series of public
scandals in the 1980s and 1990s, and ensuing public debate over allegations of excessive
use of force (sometimes lethal), discriminatory policing, sexual impropriety, and
kickback scams engaged in by a large number of police officers (Davids 2008: ch. 1).
This rise in concern was evidenced in a series of reports from the office of the Victorian
Ombudsman in the 1990s (Deputy Ombudsman (Police Complaints) 1993, 1994,
1995; Ombudsman 1994, 1997, 1998a, 1998b).
Victoria Police management were receptive to a proposal to investigate conflict of
interest in policing through empirical research on complaints data (although formal
approval processes within Victoria Police took nine months). The research involved
unfettered access to complaint case files held by the Victoria Police Ethical Standards
Department, and the cooperation of the Victorian Ombudsman, who had the statu-
tory responsibility to oversight the investigation of complaints against police. The
research was predicated on strict agreements regarding confidentiality. This study
presented a unique research opportunity because, outside of the office of the Victorian
Ombudsman, no non-member of Victoria Police had previously been granted
Boyce & Davids: Conflict of interest in policing and the public sector 609
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access to these files (see Davids 2005: ch. 2 for further information about data and
access).
Key questions for the research related to defining conflict of interest both in general
terms and in relation to the specific operational domain of policing; and examining the
relationship between conflict of interest and ethics, accountability, and disciplinary
management. The principal data for the study were ten years (1988–98) of internal
investigation complaint case files relating to conflict of interest (see Davids 2005,
2008).6 The data set consisted of 377 case files involving 539 police officers, made
available to the researcher by the Victoria Police Ethical Standards Department (for-
merly the Internal Investigations Department). The 377 cases represented approxi-
mately 3.5 per cent of complaints against police for all matters (that is, not limited to
conflict of interest) during the period. According to the dual-entry cross-notification
complaints classification and coding system operated by Victoria Police and the office of
the Victorian Ombudsman, these cases represented all complaints against police for
the period where conflict of interest was believed to form the principal focus of the
allegations (at the time of establishing the initial complaint file).7
(This study is referred to throughout this article as ‘the Policing Study’. See Davids
2005, 2006, 2008; Davids and Boyce 2008.)
Study 2: The Victorian public sector
Following the outcomes of the Policing Study, the Victorian Ombudsman expressed
interest in the researchers undertaking cooperative research with his office to extend
the study to include the entire public service. Over many years previously the
Ombudsman had, in Annual and special reports to Parliament, expressed ongoing
concern about problems of conflict of interest across the public sector. In 2002 he had
noted ‘a distinct lack of understanding of the concept of conflict of interest in the
community’ (Ombudsman 2002: 147). In 2003, a special section of the Annual Report
was devoted to the problem, describing it as an ‘ethical dilemma [that] goes to the
essence of the expectation that public officials should perform their duties in a fair and
unbiased way’. However, it was again noted that the problem is often misinterpreted
and mishandled, with a common misconception that a conflict of interest is tolerable if
no benefit is actually gained (Ombudsman 2003: 77). The issue of conflict of interest
continued to be a focus in a number of Ombudsman’s investigations in 2004 and again a
special section of the Annual Report focused on this problem (Ombudsman 2004: 89).
It might have been expected that these repeated formal concerns would have led to
effective procedures to deal with the issue and a reduction in public complaints about
conflict of interest, but the problem persisted. Continuing concerns over the volume of
complaints, complexity of the issues, and inadequate public administration and
management in this area led the Ombudsman in 2006 to announce an intention to
undertake a formal enquiry under his ‘Own Motion’ powers (Ombudsman 2006b: 13).
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As part of a collaborative research engagement, the authors of this article were sworn
in as officers of the Ombudsman for the purposes of conducting the enquiry. This
bound the researchers to the confidentiality provisions of various Acts of Parliament that
govern the work of the Ombudsman; in particular the researchers were bound not to
divulge information contained in the confidential case files.8 Ombudsman Victoria staff
identified cases (for the period 2003–6) that included conflict of interest as a primary
focus of the complaint, and a detailed examination of a sample forty-five identified
complaints was undertaken. The sample was opportunistic rather than methodical,
representative, or comprehensive. This was deemed acceptable given the qualitative
nature of the study and a primary objective to provide insights into the dimensions
of the problem of conflict of interest in the public service. The number of cases studies
was established by mutual agreement between the researchers and the office of the
Ombudsman. This number was not fixed in advance but was a practical matter that
related primarily to the desire to obtain sufficient cases to gain insight into the
variability of issues involved.
The Enquiry resulted in a report presented by the Ombudsman to the Victorian
Parliament in March 2008 (Ombudsman 2008b). (This study is referred to throughout
this article as ‘the Public Sector Study’.)
Methodology and methods
The primary research objective of both studies was to gain an understanding of the
dimensions of conflict of interest in the particular contexts identified (policing and the
public sector). Neither study sought in any way to duplicate official investigations
of complaints, nor, in general, to judge whether original investigators ‘got it right’
(cf. Moss 1997a, 1997b). Although official investigations represented in the case files
themselves were primarily undertaken under the ‘investigative’ paradigm – collecting
evidence and making determinations in relation to the substantiation of the complaint –
this research was situated in a ‘research’ paradigm which focused on explanation,
analysis, monitoring, and evaluation of pertinent issues (see Brereton 1998). As
Brereton notes, the type of evidence appropriate to the two paradigms differs. Whereas
the investigative paradigm necessarily involves production of evidence from a range
of sources and various forms of corroboration sufficient to permit judgements to be
formed, the appropriateness of evidence in research paradigm is largely determined by
the nature of the question/s being addressed and standards applied to the collection,
analysis, and reporting of evidence.
The comprehensiveness of each case file (containing all relevant material held by the
investigating/oversight authority) provided an important source of evidence relating to
the nature and dimensions of this problem. For both studies, scenarios and situations
examined were not constructed fictions based on what various players claimed they
thought or would do, but were ‘true stories’ based on what was actually said and done
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in real situations. These studies thus provide a valuable addition to a body of research
that draws on questionnaires, constructed scenarios, and individualized memoir-style
accounts (e.g. Kania 1988, 2005; Prenzler 1994; Prenzler and Mackay 1995; Macintyre
and Prenzler 1999; Kutnjak Ivkovic´ 2005).
In both studies, documents contained in each case file were examined in their
entirety and in their original state to glean practical understandings (or misunderstand-
ings) of the issue on the part of complainants (as reflected in the complaints
themselves), public sector employees and managers (in the processing of cases), and the
Victorian Ombudsman (in the oversight of cases). The understandings, attitudes,
concerns, and perceptions of members of the public (as complainants) are important
because the interrelation between public perceptions and public trust in government is
an important dimension of conflict of interest. The (mis)understandings of public sector
employees and managers and the Ombudsman are significant because they lie at the
heart of (in)effective management of conflict of interest and its relation to public sector
ethics and accountability.
For the Policing Study, each file included the original complaint, background and
investigation notes, correspondence, file notations and memoranda, and comments
from the Ombudsman, whose statutory responsibility under the Police Regulation Act
1958 included oversight of complaint investigations.9 For the Public Sector Study,
case files including the original complaint, correspondence between the Ombudsman
and relevant government Departments and authorities, investigation reports from
Departments and authorities, and all other documentation held by the Ombudsman.
Detailed case notes were taken for each file, and the nature of the complaint, types
of conflict of interest involved, outcomes, findings, and sanctions (if any), results of
internal and external oversight, and relevant organizational policies and procedures,
were coded for each case. Data coding sheets provided a basis for organizing and
classifying each complaint case, while the detailed case notes provided qualitative
material for analytical and illustrative purposes.
For the purposes of this article, classification and coding of the dimensions of conflict
of interest was undertaken in three principal stages across both projects. First an initial
understanding of conflict of interest was derived from a comprehensive literature
review, and a preliminary typology was developed (this is summarized in Davids 2005:
ch. 2). The understanding thus formed was taken into the second stage which involved
the Policing Study. In this stage a detailed examination was made of each case file,
details were recorded in the form of notes, any issues arising were clarified with
relevant Victoria Police or Ombudsman staff, and initial coding sheets were completed.
The conflict of interest typology/classification set that had been built as a result of the
first stage was modified to take account of the specifics of conflict of interest as they
emerged from the case files. The third stage effectively involved a replication of the
second stage for the Public Sector Study. Again, the typology/classification set that had
been built as a result of the first two stages was modified to take account of the specifics
of conflict of interest as they emerged from this set of case files.
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Emergent framework for understanding and managing conflict of interest
The complexities that accompany the many possible manifestations of conflict of
interest mean that it is not practical simply to identify and prohibit all forms of conflict
of interest (see OECD 2003c). Following the case analyses undertaken during the
research (as outlined above), the insights gained into the practical and ethical dimen-
sions of conflict of interest as a public problem were distilled into three broad elements
that are presented here as a framework for systematically understanding and dealing
with conflict of interest (see Figure 1).
In this framework, the first element relates to the identifiably and contextually
specific problematic nature of specific sets of private interests. As a result of the two
studies, it became evident that although it would be expected that most individual
public officers would have many private interests, the inherent nature of a small number
of categories of private interest are sufficiently problematic to justify regulation of these
interests, and of any official actions in relation to them, on public interest grounds
(these areas of interest are discussed in the next section of the article). Second, public
officers are vulnerable to several forms of duty failure that can be related to the conflicts
that arise in relation to specific or general private interests that are not dealt with in the
first element. Specifically, conflicts may be manifested either in preferential or adverse
treatment directed at public sector ‘clients’. Further, it became evident that some
identifiable areas of activity in the public sector are particularly vulnerable to conflict of
interest problems. These issues are discussed in the succeeding section of the article.
Figure 1: Mapping the terrain of conflict of interest
Boyce & Davids: Conflict of interest in policing and the public sector 613
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
0:
55
 1
5 
Ma
rc
h 
20
10
Finally, any effective system for regulating and managing conflict of interest rests on
both a sound understanding of the nature of the problem and a commitment to an
overriding ethos of ethics and accountability in the public sector – this issue is discussed
in the following section of the article.10
ELEMENT 1: REGULATING PRIVATE INTERESTS
The first framework element relates to prohibition of, or limitation on, the conduct
of specified areas of private activity. Specifically, particular interests may, by their
nature, be a concern for good governance and public administration because of the
manner in which they impinge on or interact with an official role. Regulation in this
area is always controversial because it represents an intrusion into the private lives of
public officers and may be regarded as restricting individual liberty, but it is justified by
the overriding requirement of employment in the public sector that the public interest
be prioritized.
Some areas of private activity may be regarded as inherently incompatible with
particular public sector roles such that the only way conflict of interest problems can be
avoided is to prohibit private involvement in such activities. In other areas, private
involvement may be regarded as acceptable, but still needs to be carefully managed to
avoid conflicts with official duties and to preserve and maintain public confidence in
public sector integrity and impartiality.
The case file analyses for both the Policing Study and the Public Sector Study identified
several problematic private interests, grouped here into four broad categories:
1 Outside/secondary employment and private business interests.
2 Post-employment.
3 Civic, social, sporting, and political involvements.
4 Other personal relationships, including family law problems.
Outside/secondary employment and private business
When a public officer undertakes secondary or outside employment or private business
activity, official actions may be tainted if they favour, or may reasonably be perceived to
favour, the interests of the outside employer or of the individual as an employee with
that employer, or the private business interests of the individual. There is also potential
to impact negatively on public perceptions of integrity in that public officers may be
seen by reasonable third-party observers to ‘serve two masters’. For these reasons,
standard employment conditions of public officers often include a requirement that
outside or secondary employment or the conduct of private business activity not be
undertaken without approval (specifically, for Victorian police officers – section 69(1)
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of the Police Regulation Act 1958; for other public sector employees – section 32 of
the Public Administration Act 2004).
In the Policing Study, a number of contentious areas of outside employment were
found, most notably, engagement in surveillance and security work. Specific evidence
within the case files included comments and submissions from various players –
complainants, police officers, and senior police managers – and the formal results
of internal inquiries and Ombudsman oversight. Taken as a whole, this evidence
demonstrated a general inability on the part of many police officers to clearly separate
such work from their police duties. In many cases it was the Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman, acting in his oversight role, who drew attention to this issue. Specific
problems of duty failure included the appropriation of police resources for private
benefit, misleading colleagues, non-cooperation with complaint investigators, and,
more seriously, alleged attempts to use police powers to gain various forms of business
advantage.
The Public Sector Study revealed several concerns about conflict of interest in
situations where an official position may have been used to solicit or otherwise gain an
advantage in relation to secondary employment, including the generation of business
activity for training providers (such as safety training), provision of government grants,
and contracts/tenders. Private use of official resources, time, or confidential infor-
mation was also a significant problem. In several cases involving local government
authorities, concerns were raised about associations with developers, recipients of
council grants and other forms of funding. As with the Policing Study, case file evidence
suggested that many parties, including complainants, public officers, and managers, had
a generally poor understanding of the conflicts of interest inherent in such situations.
The evidence, which included responses by both employees and managers to specific
concerns raised by the Ombudsman, demonstrated a generally poor understanding of
the nature of the conflicts of interest that arise in the context of outside employment
and private business activities.
Across both the studies, case analysis showed that although managers and authorities
with responsibility for oversight often had general confidence in the integrity of specific
individual employees, this confidence was sometimes based on subjective and personal
knowledge rather than an objective assessment of facts (using the ‘reasonable observer’
test). By contrast, complainants and members of the public were not in a position to
draw similar conclusions when appearances led to a reasonable interpretation that
private employment or business relationships may have affected the performance of
public duties. Both studies also revealed many situations where the employment and
private business interests of family members, friends, and associates of public officials
were regarded by investigators as of equivalent significance to the interests of the
individual public officer. The most serious concerns in this respect in the Policing
Study related to apparent attempts to use police position, powers, or authority to
assist family, friends, or associates in private business dealings, while in the Public
Sector Study, the main concerns related to business transactions between particular
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private parties and government agencies, semi-government bodies, and universities.
In several cases the Ombudsman concluded that Departments and agencies had
inadequate processes for managing and disclosing conflicts of interest to ensure both the
fact and appearance of probity of processes and to maintain public confidence in those
processes.
Post-employment
‘Post-employment’ refers to the situation where a public official leaves the public
service and takes up private sector employment that is in some way related to (former)
official duties (see Independent Commission Against Corruption 1997a, 1998). Prior
studies have revealed potential problems in relation to government regulatory and
policing functions, such as gaming, racing, liquor licensing, and processes related to the
approval of property development. In the present research, the Public Sector Study
found three areas of concern that are equally applicable across all areas of government.
First, a public employee may use an official position to enhance or cultivate future
employment prospects, possibly by favouring the interests of a potential future
employer. The conflict lies in the possibility that official conduct while still in public
employment may be modified by a desire to improve post-separation employment
prospects. This could include directing contracts or grants to particular organizations,
going soft in areas of regulatory enforcement, or failing to act in an impartial manner.
Once new employment has commenced, the second concern arises in that a former
public official may seek to take improper advantage of previous office through the use of
confidential information or knowledge, gaining privileged access to or preferential
treatment from former colleagues, or attempting to influence former colleagues in the
performance of their ongoing public duties.
The third concern relates to the potential for post-employment relationships to
damage public confidence in the reputation of the public service and its capacity to
serve the public interest. The core issue here is one of perceptions; it does not require
any proven wrongdoing or misconduct. This problem often comes to attention when
ex-government ministers or senior public service managers take up private sector
positions with organizations involved in government dealings, particularly if this is done
soon after leaving office.
Specific post-employment problems in the Public Sector Study related to allegations
of favouritism in the award of tenders and contracts, and the use of government
information. Several complaints related to situations where former local government
officers had taken up new roles as development or planning consultants. Even where
investigations in these cases found no evidence of misconduct (which was usually the
case), the case evidence showed how members of the public may reasonably perceive
conflicts of interest in such circumstances, leading to an inevitable loss of confidence in
the objectivity and fairness of planning and development processes.
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The Policing Study did not include any complaints about post-employment conflicts of
interest but the potential problem of divided loyalties arising in the context of potential
‘poaching’ of police employees by private contractors has been recognized elsewhere by
researchers (Ayling and Grabosky 2006: 675). The increasing use of private businesses in
relation to various aspects of policing (Davids and Hancock 1998; Ayling and Grabosky
2006) also increases the potential for post-employment relationships to influence the
performance of police duties (including administrative duties).
In dealing with problems related to post-employment as revealed by the research, it
must be recognized that restrictions on post-employment opportunities may be
controversial because they effectively limit an individual’s future right to earn an
income. Balanced against this is the manner in which perceptions of favouritism,
influence-peddling, and the use of inside information severely damages public trust, and
there is little argument that in certain circumstances the post-employment activities of
public officials could lead a reasonable observer to question the propriety of their prior
actions as public officials. In the private sector, restrictions on future employment (such
as limitations on working for a competitor) are regarded as a reasonable means to
ensure senior managers are focused on the interests of their employer. It must be
concluded, similarly, that in the public sector it is reasonable to expect that insider
information, knowledge, connections, and influence of former public servants should
not be directly or indirectly used to yield benefits to private parties. There are several
mechanisms whereby this may be achieved, including restrictions on particular kinds
of employment for a defined period after leaving the public sector and limitations on
dealings between ex-government employees and the public organizations or agencies
for which they previously worked (see Independent Commission Against Corruption
1997a, 1998).
Civic, social, sporting, or political involvements
A general principle that public employees, like other citizens, should be permitted to
engage in a range of civic, social, sporting, political and other voluntary or associational
activities is generally sound, but involvement in such activities has the potential to
present conflicts of interest similar to those outlined above in relation to outside
employment and business relationships. If a public officer has a capacity in an official
role to affect the interests of a community association, civic group, or other similar
organization with which he or she is involved, the principles of impartiality demand that
official decisions and actions in relation to such groups should be avoided. The issues are
perhaps clearest in relation to local government, where the potential for any elected
member of a local government body to be involved in conflicts of interest is widely
recognized (see Independent Commission Against Corruption 1997b). Again, regula-
tory intervention is sensitive because it involves placing restrictions on areas that would
otherwise be regarded as belonging in the private realm, however some regulation is
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justified on the public service obligation to both prioritize the public interest and
preserve/build justifiable confidence in the integrity of the public sector and its
employees.
Both the Policing and Public Sector Studies found that there is considerable potential
for personal involvements in three key areas to have a material impact both on public
perceptions and the performance of public duty – community, social, and sporting
associations; civic organizations and school councils; and local government elective
office. Perhaps reflecting the sensitivity and emotion that often surrounds local
government issues, several cases in the Policing Study demonstrated public concerns
about alleged partisanship, harassment, and intimidation in local elections (whether the
police officer was directly or indirectly involved). Although evidence was usually
insufficient to support specific allegations, media attention that flowed from such
matters was itself a cause for concern in terms of public perceptions of police integrity
and impartiality. The Deputy Ombudsman concluded in one case that the interests of
neither the Police Force nor the public are well served when police officers serve as
municipal councillors (see Davids 2006 for further discussion of this issue). Thus, as
with problems related to private employment and business interests, cases showed that
reasonable public perceptions of conflict of interest will tend to diminish trust in the
public sector, even if there is no evidence of official misconduct.
The facts in one case from the Public Sector Study are briefly reported here to
illustrate both the intricacies involved and the manner in which narrow or legalistic
interpretations may obviate important concerns about conflict of interest. This case
involved a senior Department of Sustainability and Environment officer who served in a
private capacity as a State Council member of a private body concerned with animal
welfare issues. Although there was no evidence (or assertion from the complainant)
that the official had acted improperly, the Ombudsman concluded that there was a
conflict of interest in being a senior officer of the government department responsible
for animal policy while at the same time being a board member of an animal welfare
interest group. However, formal advice provided by the Victorian Government
Solicitor’s Office drew on a formalistic and narrow reading of the Code of Conduct for
the Victorian Public Sector to conclude that there was no conflict of interest, thus
sidelining concerns about public confidence in the impartial exercise of public duties
(details of this case are reported in Ombudsman 2008b – eventually, the officer
concerned resigned his position with the animal welfare body).
Other personal relationships, including family law problems
In contrast to the kinds of employment and organizational relationships discussed above,
prohibition of personal relationships is generally not considered acceptable except in
narrowly defined circumstances such as relationships between police officers and
convicted criminals. Therefore, sensitive management of relationship-based conflicts of
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interest is likely to require that the public officer concerned declares the conflict of
interest and withdraws from involvement in the matter unless and until all parties to the
matter agree, after reasonable consideration, that the conflict of interest is not material
to any actions or decisions to be taken (see Ombudsman 2008b: 33–4).
The evidence examined in both the Policing and Public Sector Studies suggested that
conflicts of interest are likely to arise in the context of some particular problematic
personal relationships such as police relationships with informers, suspects, convicted
criminals, sex industry workers, and hoteliers; relationships between prison employees
and convicted persons; and relationships between council officers and commercial
developers or development applicants. In addition, a range of less formal private
relationships also gave rise to conflict of interest concerns. For example, family law
disputes involving police officers or their family members, and relationships with
neighbours, work colleagues, parents, and friends. Associated misconduct in such cases
included the use of confidential information, the disclosure of confidential information
to outside parties, and harassment or other forms of duty failure. A conclusion drawn in
many cases was that it is insufficient for public officers simply to assert that they did not
(or would not) allow a situation where their performance of official duties was
influenced by private or personal relationships because public confidence requires not
only that public officers act properly in relation to official process but that they also be
seen to do so.
Summary: Regulating the not-so-private sphere
Both the Policing and Public Sector Studies found evidence that some kinds of interests
that would otherwise be regarded as belonging to the personal and private realm have
an inherent capacity to impinge on the performance of public duties or to diminish
public trust and confidence in the integrity of members of the public sector. It may be
concluded, therefore, that prohibition on the holding of such interests may be justified
in the public interest. In the terms outlined earlier in the article, this is prophylactic
regulation based not in a judgement about the moral rightness of the relationships
but on their inherent capacity to interfere with the effective performance of public
duties (including the obligation to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the
sector).
ELEMENT 2: DEALING WITH CONFLICTS: REGULATING PUBLIC ACTIVITY
This section examines the second element of the framework for understanding and
dealing with conflict of interest. Specifically, the section analyses how private interests
may conflict with public duties and subsequently impact on actions taken within the
realm of the public duties of a person. In addition to the preventive effect of
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prophylactic regulation that limits specific areas of private interest (Element 1), two
principal factors make a second level of regulation and management necessary. The first
factor is that prophylaxis is not always effective – despite regulation, some identifiably
problematic private interests will still be held by individuals. Second, a range of other
private interests are more generalized in nature, and cannot easily or directly be
regulated and managed through prohibition on the holding of particular interests. This
second level of regulation and management (Element 2) involves appropriately
structuring and regulating the conduct of public duties.
Based on an analysis of the complaint cases in the Policing and Public Sector Studies,
three broad problem areas were identified, each of which consists of several dimensions
that are outlined in this section:
1 Conflicts manifested in preferential treatment for a public official or other party.
2 Conflicts manifested in adverse treatment to another party.
3 Other identifiable contexts where conflicts of interest arise in policing and the
public sector.
Preferential treatment
Concerns about preferential treatment are at the core of many complaints about conflict
of interest. As a general problem, preferential treatment involves an official acting in a
way that is, or appears to be, partial to particular individuals or groups – particularly
family members or close associates – whether or not the other party has solicited
or sought such preferment. In the extreme, preferential treatment is manifested as
nepotism or cronyism (see Pope 2000a) but at any time perceptions of favouritism are
likely to undermine public confidence.
Preferential treatment may involve an unsolicited benefit being provided to a friend
or associate of a police or public officer, but it may also entail undue influence or abuse of
office. The concept of undue influence focuses attention on relationships between two
parties such that one has influence over the other and the influential party receives
preferential treatment. Abuse of office involves the use (or attempted use) of an
official position by one person to coerce (by threat, an offer of reciprocal favour,
or other means) another person (sometimes another public official) to provide
preferential treatment to the official or associates. An additional dimension of
preferential treatment involves self-dealing, where a public official deals in an official
capacity with himself or herself in a private capacity. A conflict of interest is always
involved in such circumstances because there can be no reasonable perception of
impartiality or objectivity if an individual is involved in both sides of a decision,
transaction or event.
The breach of duties of integrity, impartiality, and fair treatment implicit in
preferential treatment will damage perceptions of the public sector regardless of
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motivation. Public officers are vulnerable to these problems because day-to-day work
incorporates many opportunities – and requirements – for the application of judgement
and discretion. Police officers are particularly vulnerable because the discretionary
elements that are integral to policing provide many opportunities for activity away from
the immediate gaze of colleagues or managers. Further, the distinction between official
police jurisdiction and matters that are more appropriately dealt with as civil matters,
together with the breadth and vagueness of the law in many circumstances, means that
it is within the legitimate realm of police discretion not to invoke the law in many cases
of minor assaults and similar offences, but aggrieved members of the public may not see
things in the same way.
The Policing Study examined seventy-four separate occurrences of alleged pre-
ferential treatment and found several manifestations of the problem. Complaints of
failure to exercise the duty of impartiality included alleged failure to take appropriate
police action against a family member, friend, or other associated party, or seeking to
delay or discontinue formal police processes. Many problems arose in relation to the
participation of a police officer in formal processes involving another police officer
with whom they had a personal friendship. There were also many instances of alleged
misuse of authority or position as a police officer by taking official action in relation to a
civil matter where, it was alleged, there should have been no police involvement –
approximately one in three of these cases resulted in formal internal investigation
findings against the police officer.
Although public complaints about preferential treatment were often soundly based,
investigations also found that they were sometimes based on assumptions made by
complainants that could not be supported by evidence, and that some cases involved
apparently vexatious motives on the part of a complainant. An interesting aspect of
many of these complaints was the context of matters related to motor vehicles, such as
traffic and associated infringements, neighbourhood/domestic disputes and a range of
business and commercial transactions including collection of civil debts, disputes over
payment for goods supplied, acceptance of cheques, matters related to commercial
tenancy, and disputes over ownership or possession of property. These cases perhaps
reflected both the combination of high visibility and sensitivity of such matters and the
street-level reality of discretionary enforcement (as a practical matter, individual police
officers apply considerable discretion in terms of the vigour with which enforcement
in such matters is pursued). These factors emphasize the importance of adopting
the ‘reasonable person’ test in investigating such matters and judging the evidence. The
evidence suggested that in many cases, internal investigators often adopted more
subjective positions based on subjective assessments of the person involved, while it was
the Ombudsman in his oversight capacity who emphasized the need to consider
reasonable public perceptions in such circumstances.
Taken as a whole, analysis of these cases demonstrated the vulnerability of police
officers to allegations of preferential treatment when dealing in an official capacity with
family, friends, or associates, even if the relationship is not close and even in regard to
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relatively minor or routine police processes. Although conflicts of interest of this type
cannot be avoided altogether because ‘[b]eing approached by a friend or acquaintance of
any degree is not a matter which in reality can be avoided’ (Deputy Ombudsman
(Police Complaints) 1995: 27), what can be avoided is official action in a conflict of
interest situation:
involvement is easily avoided by the member who is approached by directing the enquirer to a more
appropriate member to deal with the matter. In such circumstances . . . the object of the police member
approached should be to avoid performing any duties or undertaking any work in relation to the matter
raised with him by the friend or acquaintance. Doing so denies the opportunity for any conflict to arise
between the member’s professional duties and obligations, on the one hand, and on the other hand his
personal connections with the friend or acquaintance.
(Deputy Ombudsman (Police Complaints) 1995: 27)
The Public Sector Study did not find widespread problems of undue influence, abuse
of office, or self-dealing but there were various forms of preferential treatment alleged
in a range of circumstances involving tendering and contracting, development proposals
and local planning issues, child protection, employment and appointment of staff, and
allocation of grants. The analysis suggested that controversies in this area damage
perceptions of public sector integrity, particularly when accountability and transparency
is seen to be lacking. Any diminution in public confidence that is founded in reasonable
third-party perceptions is not necessarily mitigated by formal findings that there is no
evidence of actual impropriety, as was illustrated by one case examined, which attracted
significant media attention. Here, it was alleged that during a multi-million dollar
tender process, the Chief Executive Officer of the relevant government agency had
taken an overseas holiday with a member of the successful consortium. Although an
independent Departmental review found no evidence that the tender process itself had
not been fair and equitable, and the CEO had paid his own holiday expenses, problems
were identified in the process of disclosing and managing conflicts of interest. The
Ombudsman concluded that:
The CEO’s defence of his personal integrity and his subsequent attempt to demonstrate this by formally
distancing himself from the selection process showed little understanding of the need to manage both
the fact and the appearance of integrity . . . a third-party observer could reasonably have concluded that
the CEO had a conflict of interest that could have affected the tender process.
(Ombudsman 2008b: 38, emphasis in original)
It was also evident in the Public Sector Study that local government is susceptible to
allegations of preferential treatment because of the capacity of planning scheme
amendments or development and building approvals, in particular, to result in signi-
ficant financial advantage to some and (perceived) detriment to others (see Independent
Commission Against Corruption 2005; and see Ombudsman 2008a).
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Adverse treatment
Principles of procedural fairness are a central tenet of public administration, requiring
that where a decision could affect the rights or interests of another party, it must be made
in an impartial manner. If reasonable members of the public (and complainants) are to
accept that outcomes are fair, underlying processes must be characterized by openness and
accountability because public perceptions are formed in light of publicly available
information. As with preferential treatment, the application of judgement and discretion
in official processes provides many opportunities for adverse treatment, with the key
difference here being the context of a relationship of enmity between the parties.
In both the Policing and Public Sector Studies, complaints in this area tended to involve a
similar range of official processes to those involved in complaints of preferential treatment.
The Policing Study included forty-four occurrences of alleged adverse treatment in cases
where the police officer had a direct or indirect acrimonious relationship with the
complainant. Findings in approximately one-third of these cases supported at least part of
the complainant’s allegations, however sometimes allegations were based on assumptions
that could not be supported by evidence. Again,many of these complaints alleged conflict of
interest in the context of the sensitive area of law enforcement in traffic and associated
matters, but a number involved allegations that police actions had benefited the private
business or commercial interests of family members in the context of matters such as
landlord–tenant disputes, liquor licensing/enforcement, and debt collection. A small
number of complaints alleged that inappropriate action in criminal investigations, including
the laying of criminal charges, had been taken against a person in an acrimonious relationship
with a police officer (or family, friends, or associates). In such matters, the case evidence
supported a general conclusion that even if a police officer recognizes a conflict of interest in
such circumstances and explicitly seeks to take a decision that is subjectively ‘right’ and
unaffected by the relationship, the confidence of reasonable observers in the integrity of the
process is still diminished. A third-party observer cannot easily dismiss the possibility that
the private interest has affected a police officer’s judgement, even if a complaint seems to be
motivated by the negative experiences or outcomes experienced in the matter.
The Public Sector Study found allegations of adverse treatment and lack of
procedural fairness and impartiality in a range of public processes including land
valuations, award of contracts, planning and development applications, employment
and appointment decisions, supervision of employees, and the care of children. Overall,
the case analysis found several issues to be of particular significance: prejudgement,
prejudice, and ideological bias; seeking to enhance professional reputation; and pursuit
of a narrower organizational interest in the name of ‘community interest’.
Prejudgement, prejudice, and ideological bias
Victoria’s Public Administration Act 2004 (s. 7(c)(i)) requires that public officials should
demonstrate impartiality by making decisions ‘on merit and without bias, caprice,
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favouritism or self-interest’. This means that where an individual holds strong personal
views that are, in effect, encumbering interests, decisions should not be prejudged and
decision-makers must not allow personal prejudices or ideological biases to affect
decisions. This represents the subjective aspect of impartiality, but the requirement to
demonstrate impartiality also implies an objective dimension – the activity of public
officers must be seen to be impartial. Thus, if an individual’s prejudices are known by
other parties (for example, on the basis of publicly stated opinions or by virtue of holding
a position with an interest group), decisions that could reasonably be seen to be
influenced by those prejudices are likely to be tainted. This was an issue in the case
discussed earlier relating to the senior Department of Sustainability and Environment
officer who also served as a State Council member of an animal welfare body.
Similarly, in the Public Sector Study there were two cases involving child protection
and foster care where it was alleged that child protection officers had formed
preconceptions about involved parties, on the basis of relationships or prior professional
dealings rather than the facts of the matter at hand. In these matters, it was found that
the prior relationships meant that investigations of public complaints could reasonably
be seen to lack the necessary impartiality, regardless of specific allegations about
(subjective) prejudgments or prejudice.
A further significant finding from the Public Sector Study was the potential for
conflict of interest to flow from subjective ideological biases, including beliefs about
issues such as ethnicity or race. In one case, the Ombudsman (2008b: 42) concluded
that certain forms of conduct could ‘reasonably be interpreted as . . . demonstrat[ing]
inappropriate partiality on the basis of . . . ideology’. It was concluded that although any
individual may hold (and discuss) personal views, a public officer must not allow such
views to interfere with policy implementation, including procedures for dealing with
complaints about racial discrimination. This and other cases showed that particular
attention is required in areas of public administration that are subject to personal or
emotional attachment by individuals.
To some extent, allegations of prejudgement, personal prejudice, or ideological bias
may be expected in sensitive areas of government activity where individuals may
perceive that they have been treated unfairly or that their personal or political ‘rights’
are impinged upon by official decisions. Conflicts of interest in such matters are
circumvented if individual public officers avoid official involvement where a reasonable
person could conclude that they may prejudge a matter based on a personal view,
private interest, ideological bias, or previous association with a case. This does not
constitute admission of incapacity to make fair decisions, but a commitment to ethical
and accountable conduct.
Professional reputation and the pursuit of organizational interests
In addition to questions of prejudice and bias, the Public Sector Study found two
additional dimensions of adverse treatment: (1) public officers seeking to protect or
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enhance their professional reputation; and (2) the pursuit of the interests of the
government organization or agency in the name of ‘community interest’ but against the
interests of particular members of the public who, in normal discourse, would
themselves be regarded as proxies for the ‘public interest’. The first issue includes the
risk that a public officer adversely treats an aggrieved member of the public who the
officer perceives to be questioning his or her professionalism. On the basis of case
studies involving such allegations, it was concluded that public officers may have a
conflict of interest if they seek to protect their own reputation when their judgement is
questioned. For example if a ratepayer questions property valuations made for the
purpose of levying local council property taxes (rates), such an objection must be
treated seriously and possibly assessed by another officer.
The second issue – pursuit of government agency interests against the public interest –
involves a possible conflict with the rights of individual members of the public to fair,
objective and impartial treatment. The questionable action may seem to serve the
immediate interests of the organization rather than an individual, but the issues of
adverse treatment are no less significant. The Public Sector Study found that this sort of
conflict is particularly relevant where a public sector organization has combined
regulatory functions and commercial roles, but mundane government activities may also
come under this category because there is usually an organizational interest in issues
such as increased revenue flow or reduced prices paid for assets. A good illustration is
provided by a case that involved the issuance of parking infringement notices by a local
authority (see Ombudsman 2006a). Here, an apparently revenue-driven measure
resulted in a range of unfair and misleading practices and it was arguable that the
organizational interest in increased revenue flow conflicted with the public interest in
fair process and equitable access for motorists to parking spaces. The Ombudsman’s
findings in this matter demonstrated that the public interest cannot be served if
individuals have a reasonable basis to perceive that members of the public do not receive
fair treatment from a government agency, even if it can be argued that the community
overall benefits through increased government revenue receipts or in some other way.
Particular areas of conflict of interest relating to policing and the public sector
The trend to New Public Management and the infusion of private sector management
styles in recent years has resulted in an increased emphasis on the pursuit of efficiency.
These developments give rise to distinct possibilities of diminished attention to ‘public
interest’ issues and erosion in expectations and standards relating to integrity, impar-
tiality, and accountability (Doig 1995 outlines some of the tensions; see also Ring and
Perry 1985). Beyond general questions of process and fair treatment as considered in
the discussion above, both the Policing and Public Sector Studies found evidence of four
key problem areas where public sector organizations are recognized to be vulnerable to
conflict of interest problems:
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1 Acceptance of gifts and benefits (gratuities).
2 Use or disclosure of government or police information.
3 Use of official property.
4 Disposal of government assets.
Acceptance of gifts and benefits
In the private sector the giving of gifts and benefits may be regarded as a legitimate
promotional tool, and the receipt of at least some gifts and benefits may be considered
as a performance incentive or reward. The private sector is also characterized by
strategic relationship building and networking in order to gain commercial advantage,
but these approaches and attitudes are inappropriate in the public sector. The potential
problems that can arise from the receipt of gifts, benefits, and other forms of gratuity
are widely recognized throughout public sector jurisdictions (see, for example, Crime
and Misconduct Commission 2006; Independent Commission Against Corruption
2006; Integrity Coordinating Group 2006; Public Service Commissioner undated).
From the perspective of the giver, gifts may be regarded as a commercial transaction,
and ‘are rarely offered to an individual for purely charitable or hospitable reasons’
(Independent Commission Against Corruption 1999: 6). Although small gifts may
appear to have no improper motive behind them, in other cases gifts may be attempted
inducements that are ‘offered to create a sense of obligation and even an expectation
that something will be given in return’ (Independent Commission Against Corruption
1999: 6). Even small or low-value gifts of gratitude may unintentionally influence, or
be seen to influence, the actions of a public official, thereby damaging the reputation
both of the individual and their organization or agency.
As with conflict of interest issues generally, the core concern is that the receipt of
gifts and benefits may influence a public officer in the performance of official duty but
also that an impartial observer may conclude that gifts and benefits signify a reciprocal
relationship between giver and receiver. The Ombudsman (2003: 78) expressed serious
continuing concern over this issue in his 2003 Annual Report:
some persons employed in government service received and accepted invitations to attend lunches,
dinners, sporting events, golf days, concerts and other like functions. The invitations were extended on
behalf of organisations within the private sector that had direct dealings with the government body and
by organisations that were potential suppliers of goods or services to the body at some time in the future.
In some instances the invitations included the spouse/partner of the invitee.
In the present research, the Public Sector Study confirmed the continued
compromising effect of gifts and benefits in the broader public sector and a coincident
report by the Ombudsman (2008a) on conflict of interest in local government examined
the problem in that context. An illustrative case involved a senior public hospital
manager who had awarded contracts to a private company with which he had prior
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associations, and accepted lunches, dinners, and entertainment and attended major
sporting events in corporate boxes. The manager in question had been recruited from
the private sector and he stated that he had not changed his view about the appro-
priateness of accepting gifts and benefits when he entered the public sector. His
reported defence suggested many shortcomings in understanding of conflict of interest.
Further, the evidence pointed to problematic management of the issue within the
organization and the Ombudsman (2008b: 46) concluded that: ‘Underlying these poor
practices was the even poorer example set by senior managers.’
A conclusion from the cases examined in the Public Sector study is that, while
guidance such as the toolkit on Managing Gifts and Benefits in the Public Sector
produced by the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption
(Independent Commission Against Corruption 2006) is useful, a broader ethos of
accountability is required along with an acknowledgement of the priority that must be
accorded to pursuit of the public interest – both in practice and appearance.
The Policing Study also found the receipt of gifts and benefits to be an ongoing
problem, despite differing opinions on the issue in the police ethics literature (see
Davids and Boyce 2008 for a detailed discussion of police gratuities). The problem is
manifested in an implied, perceived, or actual reciprocal obligation between a police
officer and a private individual or organization.
Use/disclosure of government or police information
In the ordinary course of their work police officers and many public employees have
routine access to information of a sensitive or confidential nature, including personal
information about citizens. In general, the private use of official information – that is
only available to an individual by virtue of their position – not only breaches formal
protocols on access to and use of confidential information, but represents a breach of
the trust placed in public officers and indicates a propensity to use an official position to
advance private interests. It may therefore be a precursor to more serious misconduct.
In the domain of policing, a number of studies in many jurisdictions have reported
significant problems in terms of the unauthorized use or confidential information,
including the leaking of such information (Royal Canadian Mounted Police External
Review Committee 1991; Deputy Ombudsman (Police Complaints) 1993; Independent
Commission Against Corruption 1994; Criminal Justice Commission 2000; Miller
2003; Director – Police Integrity 2005a, 2005b). Misuse of official information is also a
significant problem across the broader public sector, as exemplified by a blackmarket
commercial trade in government information operated in New South Wales in the
1990s, where a ‘vast information network’ had developed with ‘Information from a
variety of State and Commonwealth government sources . . . freely and regularly
exchanged for many years’ between corrupt public officers and private inquiry agents,
insurance companies, and financial institutions (Independent Commission Against
Corruption 1992: 14).
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Although the personal use of government information may simply relate to the
satisfaction of personal or professional ‘curiosity’, both the Policing and Public Sector
Studies confirmed the contemporary import of this issue, finding many situations where
private use extended to gaining an advantage in private business or commercial dealings,
outside employment arrangements, a range of personal (civil) disputes, and similar
circumstances. The Policing Study examined sixty cases of use or disclosure of police
information, with an overall substantiation rate of fifty per cent. Notable problems
included:
. use of police information to assist a police officer or family, friends, or associates
in private business or commercial dealings, including in the establishment or
running of private businesses, and in landlord/tenant disputes;
. use of police information to gain a personal advantage in private, non-
commercial matters, such as family law disputes and attempts to facilitate or
further intimate personal relationships; and
. leaks of police information in the context of criminal investigations, legal cases,
or associated matters.
Although identified problems in the Public Sector Study were not as serious as
those above – reflecting the general sensitivity and volatility of confidential information
in the two domains – a number of instances of private use of government information
was found in contexts such as personal business dealings. The Ombudsman’s
report into conflict of interest in local government (Ombudsman 2008a) also drew
attention to the use of council information in post-employment situations of the type
discussed earlier in this article.
Use of official property
In both the public and private sectors, most employers accept limited private use of
organizational property such as telephones, facsimile machines, computers, and
sometimes vehicles, as a way of facilitating an appropriate work/life balance. However,
the private use of government assets, consumable items, or other resources may
represent a conflict of interest if that use:
. causes the property to be unavailable for official use;
. interferes with the performance of official work or duties;
. negatively impacts on work productivity;
. generates feelings of ill-will or favouritism if organizational guidelines for private
use are not clear and transparently applied or are perceived to favour particular
parties; or
. creates a reasonable perception that private interests prevail over the public
interest.
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In the Policing Study, although some cases involved the private use of police
resources such as vehicles, the misuse of a police officer’s identity as a police officer was
the issue that raised most concern. In particular, the production of police identification,
the wearing of (parts of) a police uniform in off-duty situations, the visible use of
marked police vehicles, and the use of official police letterhead or identifiable police
facsimile machines in the context of private activities were all seen as attempts to use an
officer’s identity as a member of the Police Force for private advantage in commercial
transactions and other interactions. The formal disciplinary offence under which such
matters were usually dealt with was s. 69(1)(e) of the Police Regulation Act 1958 on
engaging in conduct likely to bring the Force into disrepute or to diminish public
confidence in it. This provides an indication that the central aspect of this issue is the
quintessential conflict of interest concern of the effect on public perceptions of the
Force as a whole and its members.
The Public Sector Study found that the private use of government vehicles caused
certain levels of angst both within organizations and in the public eye, due to per-
ceptions of favouritism and self-interest. It was concluded that even if approved private
use of vehicles is regarded to be appropriate in some circumstances (such as for travel to
and from the place of residence of field-workers), public perception should be a key
consideration in setting agency policy, and private use should be both judicious and
appropriately recorded.
Disposal of government assets
Obsolete, out-of-date, or other surplus assets may be disposed of by government
agencies in several ways. Although the simplest and easiest means may be to ‘sell’ such
items to staff members, this inevitably entails at least the possibility of a conflict of
interest, in that such transactions are not usually undertaken on an arm’s-length basis.
Victorian Government Purchasing Board policies for the procurement and disposal of
government assets are mandatory for government Departments, the Victoria Police,
and a number of government Administrative Offices; all other agencies are required to
take them into account in their procedures (Department of Treasury and Finance
2005). In general terms, these policies require that the disposal of government assets
‘considered to be redundant, unserviceable, obsolete or surplus to requirements’ is
to be undertaken in accordance with systematic, ethical and transparent processes
(Victorian Government Purchasing Board 2005).
The studies undertaken for this research found that procedures sometimes fall short
of the requirements set out above. The Public Sector Study found that a lack of sound
organizational policies and lax supervision had facilitated breaches of procedure in
several cases. For example, in one case surplus asset disposal in a government agency
was undertaken by giving staff the opportunity to purchase the items, but formal
requirements in relation to asset disposal were not followed and assets were sold for
less than fair value. Inadequate records were kept and in some instances there was no
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record of the ostensible sale proceeds being received; it was also apparent that some
assets had been taken without payment (although later returned).
The Policing Study examined seven cases where a police officer attempted to gain
ownership of goods handled in an official police capacity, such as during the disposal
of seized or recovered stolen property. This included alleged attempts to gain
ownership of firearms: two cases involving firearms handed in to police during an
official firearm amnesty; a third involving an allegation that a police officer had
colluded with a gun shop owner to obtain a firearm in a non-market transaction;
and a fourth involving an allegation that police officers had offered to buy a firearm
that had been officially seized. The other cases in this group involved various issues
in relation to the disposal of lost, stolen, and seized property (see Davids 2005: 558
ff. for detailed analysis).
In the Policing Study evidentiary problems meant in some cases allegations were not
upheld, but across both studies the analysis illustrated a more general problem in the
failure to follow open and accountable procedures. This may result not only in the
achievement of less than full value for the public sector, but more general perceptions
that the private interests of individuals within the public sector is the motivator of some
official actions.
ELEMENT 3: DEVELOPING ETHICAL AND ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC SECTOR
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES
Taken as a whole, the case analyses and overall findings of the Policing and Public
Sector Studies provided significant evidence of insufficient understanding of conflict
of interest in policing and the public sector more broadly. Although conflict of
interest can be regarded as conceptually simple, the practical dimensions are more
complex and there are many interlinked factors that need to be clearly understood
by employees and managers. The case analyses and the Ombudsman’s findings in
many cases suggest that clear understanding of the definitional elements of conflict
of interest (as analysed in the previous two sections – interests and conflicts) must
be supplemented by a third element: the development of ethical and accountable
organizational cultures, and that these three elements of conflict of interest must be
attended to in tandem.
Interlinked elements of understanding and associated regulation: Summary
Although it is clear that not all conflicts of interest can be defined and prohibited in
advance, there are a range of private interests that are, by their very nature,
problematic. This first element of conflict of interest may form the basis of a first level
of regulation that is prophylactic in nature in that it seeks to prohibit or limit certain
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private interests not because they are regarded as intrinsically bad but because of the
nature of those interests and their tendency to interfere with official duties specific to a
particular public sector role. Although such regulation is controversial because it
intrudes on the private sphere, it is justified by the overriding principle of public service
and prioritization of the public interest – which includes the maintenance of public
confidence by attending to issues associated with public perceptions of integrity,
impartiality, and accountability.
The first level of regulation and management obviates some conflict of interest
problems by eliminating problematic interests, but some conflicts would still be expected
to arise in the ordinary course of events because public officers have a range of other,
often more generalized, interests. Thus, building on understanding of the way any
private interest may conflict with official duties, a second element of regulation and
management seeks to deal with conflicts by regulating the conduct of public activity –
work duties. Clearly, this does not present the same difficulties as regulation of private
activities, but regulation in this area needs to be carefully crafted and appropriately
implemented. On the basis of analysis in the two empirical studies reported in this
article, three broad areas for regulatory attention in terms of structuring and managing
work duties were identified:
1 Conflict of interest and preferential treatment – both in a general sense and in
the specific areas of undue influence, abuse of office, and self-dealing.
2 Conflict of interest and adverse treatment, particularly as manifested in
prejudgement, prejudice, ideological bias, a desire to enhance professional
reputation, and the pursuit of organizational interest in the name of community
interest.
3 Particular areas of vulnerability associated with the public sector and policing
contexts – acceptance of gifts and benefits, use of government information, use
of official property, and disposal of government property.
Both the Police and the Public Sector Studies found inadequate understandings of the
nature of conflict of interest in all of the above areas at operational, street/office, and
supervisory/management levels. However, both studies also found that the office of the
Ombudsman plays a significant role as an independent avenue of complaint and
oversight, forming a crucial element in the system of public sector accountability. In
numerous cases, the Ombudsman’s insights were significant in ensuring that matters
were recognized as conflicts of interest and appropriately dealt with at an organizational
level.
However, the oversight of the Ombudsman is an expression of an ex post model
of passive accountability that is, ultimately, centred on adherence to rules (see Bovens
1998; Davids 2008: chs 3 and 7). By contrast, conflict of interest as an ethical concept is
forward looking in two key dimensions: (1) seeking to deal with possible neglects of
duty before they actually happen (by envisioning ethical breaches that could flow from
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conflicts of interest); and (2) anticipating public perceptions and the possible negative
impacts on public trust in organizations, agencies, and the public sector as a whole.
Taking a broad perspective on ‘social accountability’, conflict of interest draws to
attention the way in which narrower formal accountability mechanisms may bypass
central questions of moral responsibility that lie at the heart of corruption (see Miller
1998: 51).
Greater awareness of conflict of interest issues and enhanced training for staff and
managers about how to deal with these issues is a necessary precursor to an essential
third element without which the first two elements are practically constrained. This
third element focuses on the development of ethical and socially accountable orga-
nizational cultures, building on the expansive notion of social accountability outlined
earlier in the article. This entails bringing instrumental and moral dimensions of
accountability into relation with each other (Roberts 1996) so that both structural/
regulatory and ethical/cultural dimensions are addressed. As noted earlier in the article,
the notion of ‘social accountability’ provides an avenue through which to attend to the
ethical dimensions of conflict of interest (dealing with neglects before they happen
through the management of both interests and conflicts) and to political optics in terms
of ‘how things look’ to reasonable members of the public.
Accountable and ethical organizational cultures
For conflict of interest to be effectively managed, dedication to public sector values
must go beyond rhetoric. A commitment to serving the public interest requires an ethos
of ethical conduct at all levels of government departments and agencies. This is not
something that can be expected to arise spontaneously if left to individual organizations,
especially in the context of managerialist public sector reforms which often emphasize a
different set of values (see Doig 1995; Davids and Hancock 1998). Many of the case
analyses for both the Policing and Public Sector Studies suggested that the role of
managers and supervisors is critical in leading by example and demonstrating a
commitment to ethical and accountable conduct. Ethical lapses by subordinates were
often not appropriately recognized and managed by superiors, yet supervisors are
crucial in developing and maintaining a climate of appropriate ethical behaviour in their
areas of responsibility.
In contemporary circumstances, the issue of appropriate public sector management
styles assumes greater import because of increased interactions between the private and
public sectors and the increased mobility of management between the two sectors. It is
not uncommon in the contemporary public sector environment for officials to move
regularly between the two sectors and this has resulted in a degree of convergence
between private and public sector management styles (see OECD 2003a) even though
strategic issues and values differ appreciably between the two sectors (Ring and Perry
1985; Doig 1995). Resultant tensions and uncertainties create an environment where
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there may be more potential for actual or perceived conflicts of interest. Private sector
and corporate management styles are not always appropriate in the public sector and
public trust and confidence in the integrity of the sector requires that both practices and
perceptions must be attended to.
CONCLUSIONS
Good governance – and public trust in the institutions of governance – requires that
conflicts of interest are clearly understood and managed within public sector
organizations. In the last twenty years, regulatory bodies and anti-corruption agencies
have put considerable effort into developing codes of ethics and management guides for
dealing with conflict of interest (e.g. OECD 2003b, 2005; Independent Commission
Against Corruption and Crime and Misconduct Commission 2004a, 2004b; Indepen-
dent Commission Against Corruption 2006). The operation of public complaints
systems provides something of a barometer of the ethical state of the public sector as a
whole and of individual organizations and agencies. Adopting the broad rubric of social
accountability to examine the problem of conflict of interest draws attention to the
relationship between account-givers and receivers, for those who are given respon-
sibility in the name of the public are authorized to act in particular ways, but only on
condition of accountability for those acts. The duty of accountability is constituted
by a shared acceptance that one actor owes an explanation to another (Day and Klein
1987: 5; see also Gray 1992; Gray et al. 1996; Mulgan 1997), but the initiative in
accountability processes should be with the recipient of accounts, as questioners, rather
than with the account-giver (Uhr 1993).
Research into how practical accountability plays out via public complaints sys-
tems, such as the two studies undertaken for this article, can provide important
insights into the operation of accountability. However, the evidence brought together
here suggests that on-the-ground practice is still beset with conflict of interest
problems. No area or level of the public sector is exempt from conflict of interest
problems.
Within a framework of democratic and accountable government, accountability
requires that public sector organizations implement measures to avoid conflicts of
interest where possible, to recognize them when they arise, and to identify and resolve
them clearly and quickly in an ethical and transparent manner. Reflection on the nature
and purposes of public sector activity and a clear commitment to integrity and ethics in
the pursuit of the public interest is a bedrock of a socially accountable approach – for
this to be effective, an ethos of accountability must be embraced by individuals and
managers working in the public sector, by public sector organizations, agencies and
units, and by the public sector as a whole.
The OECD’s Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service
(OECD 2003c) rest on four key principles:
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1 serving the public interest;
2 supporting transparency and scrutiny;
3 promoting individual responsibility and personal example; and
4 engendering organizational cultures which are intolerant of conflicts of
interest.
All of these elements are predicated on a broad commitment to ethics and
recognition of the core obligations of social accountability. Both of the studies reported
in this article reveal that the day-to-day practice of public sector employees often falls
short of the standards a reasonable member of the public may expect, including the
common mistaken belief that a conflict of interest is not of particular concern if there is
no nefarious intent or a specific breach of duty (see Davids 2006, 2008; Davids and
Boyce 2008; Ombudsman 2008b). Good intentions are not sufficient, for public officers
must consider how their actions would be regarded by outside parties and it must be
recognized that conflicts of interest are problematic with or without attendant breaches
of duty. Reasonably grounded perceptions alone are sufficient to undermine the
effectiveness of the public sector and conflicts of interest can damage citizen trust in
public officials and institutions both because neglects of duty that may flow from them
and the negative effects they have on public perceptions of integrity and impartiality.
This means that wide recognition that the capacity of a conflict of interest to influence
the performance of duty makes it problematic in the first instance, whether or not it is
actualized in a breach of duty, because actions or decisions taken in a conflict of interest
situation are tainted in the public eye.
The two empirical studies undertaken for this article demonstrate a lack of clear
understanding about the nature of the problem of conflict of interest and of appropriate
ways of dealing with it on the part of street-level police officers and public sector
employees. A finding of particular concern was that misunderstandings often extended
to senior management and oversight levels in both the police and the broader public
service. Practical confusion was evident about the important distinction between:
(1) having a conflict of interest; (2) taking official actions or decisions when one has a
conflict of interest; and (3) using an official position to pursue a private interest in a
manner which is at variance with official duties. All three of these elements may present
problems for public sector ethics and administration, but the evidence showed that this
is often not well understood.
Central to any quest for accountable and ethical cultures must be an overriding
commitment to serving the public interest, and this requires that the capacity for
private interests to interfere with this question be understood, recognized, and
appropriately managed. Inadequate action in this regard results in unsatisfactory levels
of organizational and social accountability. Effectively dealing with the problem requires
a combination of improved understanding, regulation, management action, ethics
training to raise awareness of the issues, and development of ethical and accountable
cultures within the public sector. Social accountability requires all players to be
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sufficiently attuned to conflict of interest issues so that they are dealt with in a way that
earns and enhances trust in public sector institutions.
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NOTES
1 For the purposes of this article, the term ‘public official’ or ‘public officer’ is used to refer to any employee
who works within the public sector. This encompasses office- or street-level employees, managers and
executives, and may also be taken to include elected government officials.
2 The duties of public sector employees are broadly defined to encompass explicit work roles and a range of
other factors that pertain to good governance, effective management, furtherance of the public interest, and
the maintenance of public trust.
3 Black’s Law Dictionary restricts the concept of conflict of interest to the ‘private pecuniary interest of the
individual’ (cited in Carson 1994: 390).
4 For example, the United Kingdom’s Committee on Standards in Public Life (1995) enunciated seven
‘principles of public life’: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and
leadership. Victoria’s Public Administration Act 2004 (s. 7) outlines core public sector values of
responsiveness, integrity, impartiality, accountability, respect, leadership, and human rights.
5 The Victorian Ombudsman is an independent statutory office holder with the power to investigate, review,
and resolve complaints about administrative actions taken by government departments and agencies. The
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction encompasses all government departments and more than 600 public sector
agencies including twelve professional boards, seventy-nine local councils, universities and government
schools, public and private prisons, authorized officers on public transport and animal welfare (RSPCA)
inspections.
6 Other primary documentary sources were examined, including various Victoria Police written operating
procedures, a range of statutory and regulatory requirements and guidelines, memoranda, and policy and
review documents. Although these sources were helpful in gaining an understanding of the formal workings
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formal workings of the organization and some of the nuances in its culture (see Marshall and Rossman 1995),
they were not significant in terms of the primary research questions that related to developing an
understanding of the particular problem of conflict of interest.
7 In practice, although the data set was extensive, a range of factors including the multidimensional nature of
many complaints necessarily meant that it was not practically possible to include all conflict of interest cases
for the period in the data set (see Davids 2005: ch. 2).
8 It should be noted that this article aims to provide a relatively high-level overview of the results of the two
studies and contains no confidential information, nor specific case data that has not been previously published
in a publicly available source (especially: Davids 2005, 2008; Ombudsman 2008b).
9 This function is now performed by Victoria’s Office of Police Integrity.
10 Constraints of space do not allow detailed exposition of cases to illustrate the problems in relation to each of
these elements, and this is not necessary for the analysis in this article. References to the Policing Study are
supported by detailed case analyses in Davids (2008) while case analyses supporting the Public Sector Study
are contained in Ombudsman (2008b).
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